Trademarks in Tying and Exclusive Dealing Agreements by O\u27Neill, Bruce C.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 3 Winter 1966 Article 9
Trademarks in Tying and Exclusive Dealing
Agreements
Bruce C. O'Neill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Bruce C. O'Neill, Trademarks in Tying and Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 612 (1966).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol49/iss3/9
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Trademarks in Tying and Exclusive Dealing Agreements: The
opinion of the Federal Trade Commission in Carvel Corporation1 raises
two issues for consideration in this article: a) whether a trademark
can be a tying product, and b) whether all exclusive dealing agreements
shall be subject to the qualitative analysis test.
The action was brought against Carvel under Section 5 ("unfair
methods of competition") of the Federal Trade Commission Act 2 and
necessarily concerns principles and decisions resulting from applica-
tions of Section 1 ("restraint of trade") of the Sherman Act3 and Sec-
tion 3 ("to substantially lessen competition") of the Clayton Act.'
There is a large amount of interchangeability among these three sec-
tions, but general distinctions may be noted :' a) the Clayton Act and
the FTC Act were enacted to supplement the Sherman Act;" b) the
Sherman Act requires actual restraints of trade, while the Clayton Act
and the FTC Act require only a reasonable probability thereof ;7 c)
the Clayton Act requires specific violations, while the Sherman Act and
FTC Act are couched in general terms; d) exclusive arrangements are
charged under the FTC Act only when the Clayton Act does not
apply-'
I Carvel Corporation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 117298 (1965).
2 "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15
U.S.C. §45 (1964).
3 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ..... 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §1 (1964).
4"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price on the condition, agree-
ment, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use
or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement,
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14(1964).
5 See generally, Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Sec. 5 of the Federal
Trade Comnission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MicH. L. REv.
821 (1961) ; Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 930 (1962); Comment, 59 MicH. L. REv. 1236 (1961).
6 F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931); Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922).
7 Standard Fashion Co., note 6 supra at 356-57; F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
s Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act as an Antitrust Larw, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 173 (1960) ; Paley,
Antitrust Pitfalls in Exclusive Dealing-Recent Decisions under the Sherman,
Clayton, and FTC Acts, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499, 507 (1962).
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However, it is the substance of the violation, rather than the act
violated which is the more determinative factor in antitrust law. In the
area of exclusive arrangements, which is the subject of this article,
there are three basic types :9 the tying agreement, the exclusive dealing
agreement, and the requirements agreement. The tying agreement is
one whereby a vendee or lessee is required, as a condition to the sale
or lease of a desired product (the "tying product"), to purchase or
lease some other product (the "tied product") of the seller or lessor.
The vendee or lessee is forced to take one or more other products to
get the tying product. An exclusive dealing agreement is one whereby
the vendee or lessee is required, as a condition to the sale or lease of a
product, not to use or deal in the product of a competitor. A require-
ments agreement is one whereby a vendee or lessee is required, as a
condition to the sale or lease of a product, to buy or lease all or part
of his subsequent needs of that product from that seller or lessor. As
can be seen, an agreement requiring a vendee to purchase all of his
subsequent needs of a product from a particular seller is, in all practical
effects, the same as an exclusive dealing agreement.
In 1962, at the commencement of suit, the Carvel Corporation had
approximately 340 franchised dealers located in eight states, including
Wisconsin. The vast majority of these were located within a one-
hundred mile radius of New York City. In 1959, Carvel's sales in a
five state eastern area totalled $5 million, of which seventy per cent was
accounted for in New York State. For purposes of this opinion, the
New York area was used as a test market.' 0 In this area, Carvel had
37.7 per cent of the soft ice cream market and 4.5 per cent of the com-
bination soft and hard ice cream market.
Carvel was charged with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act be-
cause of conditions in its agreements with it franchisees. These condi-
tions were alleged to be illegal insofar as they required each dealer:
1) to purchase his entire supply of ice cream mix and associated pro-
ducts from Carvel or from sources designated by Carvel, 2) to refrain
from selling any products not authorized by Carvel, 3) to purchase
various items of equipment from Carvel, 4) to adhere to these contract
provisions under the eye of a rigorous policing system involving threats
and coercion directed at dealers and non-approved suppliers, and 5)
to refrain from entering into a similar business within three years after
termination of the franchise period.
This article will center on the first charge."
9 See 1 TRADE REG. REP. l 2910, 2920, 2930 (1965).
10 The theory of injury in the complaint was the foreclosure of the Carvel dealer
market to the dairies which were not selected by Carvel. Although Carvel
operates in interstate commerce, the markets in which the various dairies
effectively compete is local.
11 The other four charges were given scant space in the opinion. All were ruled
in favor of Carvel.
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I. THE TRADEMARK AS A TYING PRODUCT
The FTC examiner found the Carvel franchise agreements to be
tying agreements. As a condition to the leasing of the Carvel trademark
(the tying product), the franchisees were required to purchase ice
cream mix, equipment, and commissary items (the tied products) from
Carvel or from sources designated by Carvel. The mix was to be
bought from authorized dairies in the dealers' area, which produced
the mix under contract with Carvel and in accordance with specifica-
tions furnished them by Carvel and at prices set by Carvel. The exam-
iner found these agreements to be illegal under the Northern Pacific
test, because Carvel had sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product and a "not insubstantial amount" of interstate com-
merce was affected.1 2
However, the Commission, in reviewing these findings, held that a
trademark' s could not be a tying product, as it cannot be viewed separ-
ately from its product.14 The name "Carvel" and the subject Carvel ice
cream cannot be viewed as distinct. Actually, though the opinion does not
cite the case, this is a reversion to the old Macmahon doctrine that a
trademark is not by itself such property as can be transferred, and the
right to use it cannot be assigned except as incidental to the transfer
of the business or property with which it has been used.' 5 Thus, rea-
soned the Commission, it would be conceptually impossible for a trade-
On the second charge the Commission reasoned that since any defects in
these non-Carvel products (e.g. frankfurters, hamburgers) would be attributed
to Carvel, and since Carvel would not be able to control such defects, this
restriction was reasonably necessary to protect Carvel's goodwill and trade-
mark image. Also, this restriction could not be said to lessen competition,
since Carvel was not in competition with the manufacturers or distributors of
these non-Carvel products. Carvel Corporation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. Jf17298 at
22430-431 (1965). For a more explicit statement of the first point, see Susser
v. Carvel, 332 F. 2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964).
Actually, this alleged violation was the dealers' main complaint. They
wanted to broaden out and become food stands and restaurants rather thanjust ice cream stands. Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1171, 1199 nn. 183 & 186 (1963).
Concerning the third cbarge it was found that the dealers could buy equip-
ment from other suppliers, as long as it met Carvel's standards and speci-
fications. Also, the evidence of any violation failed to meet the market an-
alysis standard of proof. Carvel Corporation, supra, at 22431. Cf. Engbrecht
v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D. Kan. 1962), where DairyQueen did not require its dealers to purchase a particular mix but did re-
quire the purchase of Dairy Queen freezer equipment. The restrictions in-
volved in the fourth and fifth charges were held to be reasonable. Carvel
Corporation, supra, at 22431-432.
12 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
23 As defined by the Lanham Act, the term "trademark" includes any "word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from
those manufactured or sold by others." 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §1127(1964).
14 Carvel Corporation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17298 at 22425-426 (1965).
1r Macmahon Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 468, 475 (8th
Cir. 1901).
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mark to be a tying product, because a tying agreement must necessarily
concern two separate and distinct products. 16
Twenty years ago this position would have been valid, as prior to
the Lanham Act" a trademark was used to indicate the source or origin
of the goods to which it was affixed. By this theory, the owner of a
trademark could license it to another to use only if the licensor actively
participated (e.g., by supplying some essential ingredient) in the pro-
duction of the goods. If he did not, and disassociated himself from the
production of whatever goods the licensee was putting out under his
trademark, he would be held to have abandoned that trademark, since
it no longer would indicate a uniform source and/or origin. As the
case of United Drug v'. Rectanus Co.,'5 one of those cited by the FTC
as authority for its holding, explained the trademark, "its function is
simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and
to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his;
and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an exist-
ing business."1 9
However, today and ever since the Lanham Act, trademark licens-
ing is based no longer upon the source theory but on a "guaranty"
theory. A trademark now signifies only the quality of the goods. When
the consumer purchases goods under a certain mark, that mark tells
him not where the goods originated, but that they have been produced
under uniform standards of quality, as were the goods, past and present,
sold under that name. The licensor is released from any duty to actively
participate in the production or preparation of the goods, being re-
quired only to control the quality of the goods produced under his
trademark.2 0 As a 1963 Yale Law Journal article summed it up:
Under the older view that trademarks indicated the source of
goods, permissible licensing occurred only where the licensor
so actively participated in the preparation of the final product
through the supply of an essential ingredient or service that cus-
tomer attribution of origin to the licensor was reasonably ac-
curate. Thus, permissible trademark licensing was generally
limited to such arrangements as manufacturer-further proces-
sor relationships where some major part of the finished product
16 Carvel Corporation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17298 at 22426 (1965), citing Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
17 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1964).
15248 U.S. 90 (1918).
1 9 Id. at 97.
20 "Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may be
used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of
the registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the
validity of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used
in such manner as to deceive the public." 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C.§1055 (1964). The term "related company" is defined as "any person who
legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registra-
tion in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connec-
tion with which the mark is used." 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1964).
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was supplied by the licensor. The guaranty theory removed this
burden of active participation, substituting for it the lesser ob-
ligation of licensor control over the quality of goods emanating
from different sources.2
1
In Dazn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 2 the court ob-
served that, prior to the Lanham Act, trademarks could be transferred
only in connection with goods. However, since the Lanham Act, "con-
trolled licensing does not work an abandonment of the licensor's regis-
tration, while a system of naked licensing [i.e., without any control]
does."2 3 Likewise, the case of Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc.24
held that the licensor does not have to participate in the final product
in any other way than to control its quality. The above article noted
that these two cases,
with their reading of the Lanham Act to extend the scope of
permissible licensing beyond the strictness of the source theory,
recognize the irrelevance of actual source . . . [and, the author
concludes] the assurance of uniform quality may be the only
safeguard from confusion and deception the consumer can ex-
pect.2
5
It seems the majority viewpoint would be that a trademark is separ-
able from that to which it is affixed. A case particularly in point is the
1964 case of Susser v. Carvel Corp.,2 6 a private suit by a dealer against
Carvel on grounds almost identical to those of the FTC in this opinion.
There it was said that "it seems clear in compelling circumstances the
protection of good will, as embodied for example in a valuable trade-
mark, may justify an otherwise invalid tying agreement." 27 Also,
The true tying item was rather the Carvel trade-mark ....
There may, of course, be cases where a trade-mark has acquired
such prominence that the coupling of some further item to its
license would constitute a per se violation; but such a trade-
mark would satisfy the market dominance test of Times-Picayune
and Northern Pacific. The figures show that Carvel is not such
a mark .
2
A trademark also has been viewed in the role of the tied product.2 9
Of the three cases the Commission cited for authority in Carvel,
two were pre-Lanham 30 and the third was a 1962 case from the fifth
22 Note, 72 YALF L. J. 1171 (1963). One of the earliest cases supporting this
line of reasoning is E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 167
F. 2d 484, 489-90 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
22267 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
23 Id. at 367.
24 176 F. Supp. 377, 378-79 (E.D.Pa. 1959).
25 Note, supra note 21 at 1188.
28 332 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
27 Id. at 512. See also Krayer, Domestic Trademark Licensing, 43 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y. 574, 585 (1961).28 332 F. 2d at 519.
29 Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F. 2d 39, 44 (7th Cir. 1961).
-1 Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) ; United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248
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circuit. The Commission referred to the court's statement in the latter
case that "a trademark cannot travel to places where there is no article
to bear it and no trader to supply the article." 31 This is true, but it does
not say that the licensor must supply the article. The statement of the
court was in part answer to a licensee's objection to a provision of the
license agreement, restricting him to an assigned sales area. The court
approved of the territory limitation as a valid exercise of the licensor's
duty to control his mark; for if there were no such restrictions, the
mark could be said to exist everywhere. And yet, this is impossible,
because it can exist only with an article or business (no matter by whom
produced), and so could be held to be abandoned by the licensor.3 2
Thus, conceptually, a trademark may be a tying product. Once the
involved trademark agreement is held to be a tying agreement, it must
be resolved whether it is substantial enough to be subject to the anti-
trust laws. 33 In this area it has been said:
Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition. The justification most often advanced in
their defense-the protection of the good will of the manu-
facturer of the tying device-fails in the usual situation be-
cause specification of the type and quality of the product to be
used in connection with the tying device is protection enough.' 4
However, in certain situations, even though technically violative of
the antitrust laws, tying agreements are justifiable. In the case of Baker
v. Simmons,35 it was held that:
business arrangements which conceptually could be styled 'tie-
ins' might be exculpated from the reach of the antitrust laws if
the arrangement was actuated by or could be explained on the
basis of a legitimate business justification as opposed to an im-
proper motive, e.g., desire to increase market control through the
economic leverage supplied by the tying agreement." 6
U.S. 90 (1918). Cited at Carvel Corporation, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 117298 at
22425 (1965).
31 Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Company, 308 F. 2d 403, 409 (5th
Cir. 1962).
32 If the trademark is so widespread that the licensor cannot control its quality,
it will either be held to have ceased to exist or will become public.
33 As later discussion will show, the Commission stated that even if it had held
the agreement to be a tying agreement, Carvel lacked sufficient economic power
to make the agreement subject to the antitrust laws.
34 Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). Accord, Insto
Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363, 364 (1954). See also Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements lunder the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 51, 62, 64
(1958).
35 307 F. 2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962).
36 Id. at 468. Even the Denison case upholds this point. Denison Mattress Factory
v. Spring-Air Company, 308 F. 2d 403, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1962). Other cases
which have justified tying agreements are Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's FoodStores, Inc., 267 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc.,
176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.Pa. 1959) ; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F. 2d 505 (2d
Cir. 1964); United States v. Jerrold, 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.Pa. 1960), aff'd,
365 U.S. 567 (1961) ; Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d
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In trademark situations, a plausible business justification is that
under the Lanham Act a lessor necessarily must control the quality of
the goods produced under his mark, else he will be held to have aband-
oned his mark. And, the lessor may argue, the tying agreement is the
only sufficient means to meet that requirement of quality control.3 7 So
the question is whether Carvel could have fulfilled its duty to control
the quality of the ice cream by simply supplying its dealers with speci-
fications and standards for the ice cream mix. If such means would not
be sufficient the tying agreement would have been necessary and, thus,
legitimate in fulfilling Carvel's duty of quality control.
The Commission discussed this point of justification in a slightly
different context. Having held there could be no agreement, the Com-
mission held that trademark agreements are still subject to the anti-
trust laws.38 The test of the restrictions within the agreement is whether
their main purpose is lawful and whether it can be said that any re-
sulting restraint of trade is merely ancillary to this lawful purpose.3 9
The Commission found the lawful purpose to be Carvel's duty to con-
trol quality and that the tying agreement was its only way of maintain-
ing such control. This same argument made to justify the trademark
agreement is applicable to justify the trademark tying agreement.
The Commission argued that by the Lanham Act a lessor must con-
trol the quality of his lessee's dealings under his trademark to insure
that they will apply the mark to either the same product or to one of
substantially the same quality with which the public in the past has
associated the product.40 If he does not retain such control, he will be
held to have abandoned such trademark.41 Ordinarily, such control can
be maintained by supplying the dealers with specifications; however,
the Commission held that this is not true with a product as distinctive as
food. The opinion cites the holding of Susser v. Carvel:
Such cases [i.e., those holding specifications are possible for
manufacturing mechanical products] are scarcely relevant to
641 (7th Cir. 1935). It seems that even tying agreements involving patents
(and thus copyrights also) can be justified. That a patent is only prima facie
proof of monopoly over the tying product, see Standard Oil v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
10 n.8 (1958). But cf. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962)
But see Susser v. Carvel Corp., supra, at 520-21.
'z Not only is there the danger of the licenser losing his trademark, but there
is the onus of possible tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§402A-
402B (1965).
38 It is uncertain, at this point, whether the Commission is viewing the agree-
ment simply as a trademark agreement; as a semi-tying agreement like that
in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965) ; or, as the agree-
ment is later held to be, an exclusive dealing agreement, Carvel Corp., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 117298 at 22430 (1965).
39 Carvel Corp., id. at 22426, citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
40 Carvel Corp., note 38 supra at 22428.
41 See p. and note 20 supra.
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the problem of controlling something so insusceptible of precise
verbalization as the desired texture and taste of an ice cream
cone or sundae; that Carvel was able to specify this to its source
of supply, whose product it regularly checked, does not show
that administration could be confided to 400 dealers.42
If each Carvel dealer could purchase from whom he pleased, the
Commission reasoned that Carvel would not be able to meet its obliga-
tion of quality control, as the inspection burdens would be too great.
However, this line of reasoning could be made by any trademark
licensor having substantial size. That inspection problems might be
burdensome would seem to stem from the fact of its size rather than
its system of quality control. The Commission's second argument is
more cogent. It was contended that the public has come to expect
more from Carvel than just quality. It has come to expect the distinctive
taste of a Carvel ice cream cone. To insure Carvel's good will and
avoid consumer deception, 43 the restrictions on the purchase of the mix
were held to be necessary for uniformity control; else the taste of a
Carvel cone, no matter what its quality, could vary from state to state.
The Commission concluded that the duty to control under trademark
law is twofold-quality and uniformity.4" With a product as "impre-
cise" as food, while quality might be achievable by specifications, uni-
formity would not be.
In its final analysis of the point, the Commission ruled that Carvel,
by its restrictions, had a primary and reasonable purpose of protecting
42 332 F. 2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964). Also, the fact that Carvel had a secret pro-
cess for its mix is probably relevant. Dr. Miles 'Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911).
•13 On the duty to prevent consumer deception, see Baker v. Simmons Co., 307
F. 2d 458, 469 (1st Cir. 1962) : "In short, where the clear import of the sign
program was to convey the message that a Beautyrest awaited the traveler
inside, the Simmons Co. had ample justification in seeking to insure that the
realization met this expectation. Simmons had'a right, indeed a duty, to in-
sure the truthfulness of its advertising and to exclude the possibility that a
careless or capricious innkeeper might shortchange his guests with a dif-
ferent mattress."
• "The most difficult aspect of the opinion is the Commission's use of the principle
of duty to control. The Commission uses it as part of its argument that a
trademark cannot be a tying product: "[S]ince trademarks may be licensed
but only on condition that the trademark owner retains control over the
licensee's use of the trademark, it is conceptually impossible, in our opinion,
to view a license to use a trademark as separate and distinct from the sale
of the trademarked product or its ingredient." Carvel Corp., 3 TRADE REG.
REP. 117298 at 22436 (1965). However, the Commission states, the trade-
mark agreements are still subject to antitrust laws; and the restrictions within
the agreements are illegal unless 'their primary purpose is to protect the
trademark, any restraint of trade being ancillary. The duty to control is then
used to validate the restrictions as having a primary purpose that is lawful.
It is the writer's position that a trademark can be a tying product and
viewed as separate from the tied product to which the trademark is affixed.
As the Commission states, "There is no case which has held that a trademark
licensor must itself manufacturer the trademarked products or their ingredi-
ents in order to retain control over the quality and uniformity-of such products."
Carvel Corp., supra, at 22427. Once established as a tying agreement, then the
duty to control is used to justify it, if possible.
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its mark and insuring the quality and uniformity of its product. Any
restraint of trade (here, the foreclosure of non-authorized dairies in
the area) was held to be merely ancillary to this valid purpose. Thus,
Carvel was not liable under the general antitrust laws.
45
As noted earlier, this same line of reasoning, on quality and uni-
formity control, would have justified the trademark agreement even
though it was a tying agreement. Therefore, whether it was a tying
agreement or not made no practical difference in this case. However,
this might not be true in other cases. When viewed as a tying agree-
ment, a trademark agreement faces a more stringent test than when
viewed as an exclusive dealing agreement. The necessary sufficient
economic power is more easily found, and it should not have the
benefit of the harder to prove market analysis test applicable to ex-
clusive dealing agreements.46 As such, it is easier to prove illegal and
harder to justify.
In the Carvel fact situation it appears obvious that the commissary
items were tied to the trademark. Had they been found to constitute
a substantial amount of trade rather than "de minimis," this part of
the franchisee's agreement also would have been subject to the antitrust
laws. It is doubtful whether the argument of quality and uniformity
control would have justified the dealers being forced to buy the nuts,
toppings and like items from Carvel. Here, specifications and standards
set by Carvel would have worked as well. It is submitted that the
trademark tying agreement would have been found to be illegal.
47
After having decided the agreement was not violative of the anti-
trust laws, the Commission did deal with the agreement as a tying
agreement. However, it did so only partially and, even then, in a hypo-
thetical sense.
The Commission, probably with an eye toward further litigation,
stated that even if the subject agreement were a tying agreement,
neither the law nor the evidence in this case was sufficient to justify
a finding of illegality. 4s The illegality of a tying agreement turns upon
whether a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product and "a not 'insubstantial amount' of interstate commerce
is affected." 49 The Commission ruled that, upon the record, the ex-
aminer was incorrect in finding that Carvel had met the first require-
45 Carvel Corp., id. at 22428.
46 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1958) ; Insto Gas Corp.,
51 F.T.C. 363, 364 (1954).
47 This is so although the courts have been liberal in recent decisions concerning
tying restrictions in trademark agreements. Note 72 YALE L. J. 1171, 1173
(1963).
48 Carvel Corp.. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17298 at 22429 (1965).
49 356 U.S. at 11.
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ment of "sufficient economic power" or "dominance." 50 A trademark,
by itself, does not confer monopoly power on its owner, as is the case
with -a patent or copyright;51 nor, argues the Commission, was the
fact that Carvel controlled 37.7 per cent of the soft ice cream market
conclusive, in itself, of sufficient economic power.
The Commission was unable to conclude from the record that Car-
vel had the requisite power in the trademark and, thus, in the soft ice
cream business to pressure dealers and prospective dealers into pur-
chasing its tied products. The position was indicated that the business
was not difficult to enter; the capital requirements were not extensive;
and there were many competitors, both chain and independent, within
the business. It is important to note that these statements are not posi-
50 "Dominance," as the term was used in the past, is no longer necessary for
tying agreements to be violative of antitrust laws. As Northern Pacific, ibid,
states, only "sufficient economic power" is needed. Such dominance, in the
term of monopolistic position, was originally the test.
In construing a tying agreement under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, it
was held that if a company with a "dominating position" had such restrictive
and tying agreements, they must necessarily restrict competition. United
Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922). Then the swing
was to emphasis being upon the amount of commerce affected. International
Salt Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), held that "it is unreason-
able, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market." The test
was one of pure quantum, here the salt company tied $500,000 worth of salt
to its sales of salt depositing machines. Then Times-Picayune v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953), purported to make either test applicable under the Clayton
Act and a combination of the two applicable under the Sherman Act. The
Court noted (345 U.S. at 608-09) :
From the 'tying' cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges: When
the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying'
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product
is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards ex-
pressed in §3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite
potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a
lawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market,' a tying agreement is banned by §1 of the
Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met. In either case the ar-
rangement transgresses §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since
minimally that section registers violations of the Clayton and Sherman
Acts.
The decision (345 U.S. at 612) makes it clear that when dealing in terms of
a substantial volume of commerce, more proof is needed than the mere
showing of a percentage (Standard Oil) or a dollar volume (International
Salt).
The last definitive case in this area has been Northern Pacific, which does
away with dominance. Practically, if one can prove the second part of its test,
i.e., a "not insubstantial amount," the first, "sufficient economic power," would
seem to follow as a matter of course, since the second could not be achieved
without the first. See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under
the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 61-62 (1958) ; Lockhart and Sacks,
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining whether Exclusive Ar-
rangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 945
(1952).
5x Carvel Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17298 at 22429 (1965). It is the very es-
sence of a patent or copyright that its subject is one of a kind and unique in
itself. The courts have been reluctant to allow a licensor to extend his patent
or copyright monopoly by its use in a tying agreement. United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962). But that it may be justified in certain
instances, see note 34 supra.
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tive assertions. The Commission simply stated that there is nohing
in the record to prove their contrary to be true.52
The Commission next extended its hypothetical of the tying agree-
ment one step further. It stated that even if Carvel's share of the
market were enough to establish the element of sufficient economic
power; there was still a failure of proof as to a showing of a not
"insubstantial amount" of commerce being affected. In this later sense
the Commission held it to be irrelevant whether the foreclosure of the
market be viewed as 4.5 per cent of the hard and soft ice cream market
or 37.7 per cent of the soft ice cream market.53 Before entering into
this second point, the Commission dropped the hypothesis of the tying
agreement.54
II. TIiE TRADEMARK AGREEMENT AS FORCING EXCLUSIVE DEALING
The Commission stated that the trademark agreement involved was
actually an exclusive dealing agreement. As such, the Commission
argued, the test of its effect on commerce must be judged according to
the rigor of the market or qualitative test of Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co.55 In this manner the Commission entered into the
qualitative (rule of reason, market analysis) versus quantitative (dollar
volume or percentage) controversy in exclusive dealing agreement
decisions and opinions.
The reasoning in exclusive dealing decisions begins much the same
as with tying agreements. In Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston
Co.,56 the Court stated that the dominance of the seller would be all
that is necessary to make the agreement violative of the Clayton Act.
This test was modified by the leading case of Standard Oil v. United
States.5 7 Standard was the largest seller of gasoline in a seven-state
Western area. It had exclusive dealing contracts with 5937 independent
stations or sixteen per cent of the retail gasoline outlets in the Western
area selling 6.7 per cent of the gasoline and over $8.2 million worth of
other products.
justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, held that even though
the seller could not be said to have a dominant position (only 6.7
per cent of the market), "Section 3 of the Clayton Act is satisfied
by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected." The test was stated in terms of a
quantitative market share rather than a strict dollar volume test as
used in International Salt" and strictly rejected any rule of reason
52 Carvel Corp., ibid.
3 Id. at 22430.
54 Ibid.
55365 U.S. 320 (1961).
56 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
57337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
58332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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test. 9 One need not prove the probable effects in the market, if he can
show a substantial share of commerce affected.
However, the Tampa case, without overruling the Standard case,
applied the rule of reason to the exclusive dealing arrangement be-
tween the Tampa Electric Company and National Coal Company. The
public utility company contracted to buy all of its coal needs for the
next twenty years from the coal company. This contract would amount
to about $128 million over the years. Though this projected amount of
coal would exceed the entire amount of coal otherwise used in the
peninsular area of Florida during the same period, the court held the
relevant market to be that within which the coal supplier effectively
competed. This broadened it to a seven state area, wherein the par-
ticular contract would account for only .77 per cent of the total sales.
Rather than applying any quantitative tests, the court held:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to
weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account the relative strength
of the parties, the proportion of volume of commerce involved
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant
market area, and the probable immediate and future effects
which pre-emption of that share of the market might have on
effective competition therein. It follows that a mere showing
that the contract itself involves a substantial number of dollars
is ordinarily of little consequence. 0
The Commission in Carvel adopted the Tampa test:
The theory of injury in complaint counsel's case is principally
the foreclosure of Carvel's dealers as possible market outlets
for other manufacturers of soft ice cream mix. Reliance is placed
solely on the percentage share of soft ice cream mix consumed
by Carvel dealers. However, the Carvel franchise agreement,
which is in fact an exclusive distributorship agreement, should
be evaluated in terms of the criteria set down in Tampa ... for
viewing exclusive dealing arrangements, and that the alleged
foreclosure of mix suppliers from the Carvel market should be
determined in a broader economic context in an effort to de-
termine 'the probable immediate and future effects which pre-
emption of that share of the market might have on effective
competition therein.' 61
59 The rule of reason test, as stated in an early case, held that "the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the na-
ture of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts." Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). As simply stated, "the
relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in
which that factor is placed." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 528 (1948).
60 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
61 Carvel Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17298 at 22430 (1965).
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The Commission then stated that the record was silent as to the opera-
tions of these other dairies; as to what percentage of these dairies'
sales was accounted for by the sale of soft ice cream mix; and as to
whether or not the soft ice cream mix market being foreclosed, the
dairies could switch to other markets.6 2
Thus the FTC opinion adopted the qualitative test for exclusive deal-
ing agreements, which test obviously supplies a more difficult standard of
proof than the quantitative test, which merely involves proving a
dollar volume or a market percentage. The question has been asked, 6
and it is not fully clear, which standard the FTC will apply from one
opinion to the next.
Malico Company, Inc., in 195364 reviewed an examiner's findings on
an exclusive dealing contract under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The
examiner cited the Standard case and held there must have been a sub-
stantial lessening of competition, because the defendant was one of
the largest companies in the hearing aid field. The examiner excluded
all evidence of actual competitive effect. However, the Commission
reversed and, in effect, rejected Standard insofar as it held one need
only show the foreclosing of a substantial share of commerce under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The Commission stated that while this
might be a proper test for the courts, it was not so for the Commission,
which Congress created "with the avowed purpose of lodging the ad-
ministrative functions committed to it in 'a body specially competent
to deal with them by reason of information, experience, and careful
study of the business and economic conditions of the industry af-
fected. ... 65 In effect, it held that the FTC, due to its inherent ex-
pertise, would extend the full-searching qualitative test to every ex-
clusive dealing agreement.
But the Dictograph Products, Inc. v. F.T.C. case 66 appeared, in
1954, to revert back to the quantitative rule. The defendant did $2
million worth of business a year (again, in the hearing aid field) and
controlled 22.7 per cent of the market. Without more the court found
the company's exclusive dealing agreements violative of Section 3 of
the Clayton Act. The court cited Standard as authority. Purporting
to definitively construe that section of the Clayton Act, the Court
62 There are ten different instances in the opinion where the Commission either
finds the record silent or lacking sufficient evidence to substantiate a certain
point. Ibid.
63 Lockhart and Sacks, op. cit. supra note 50, at 937-38; Paley, Antitrust Pitfalls
in Exclusive Dealing-Recent Developments under the Sherman, Clayton, and
F.T.C. Acts, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499, 518 (1962); Comment, 59 MICH. L.
REv. 1236, 1252 (1961).
64 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953). See Harley-Davidson Motor Corp., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1066
(1954) ; Roux Distrib. Co., 55 F.T.C. 1386, 1388 (1959).
65 Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. at 487-88.
66 217 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). See Anchor Serum Co. v. F.T.C., 217 F. 2d 867,
872 (7th Cir. 1954).
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stated, "It is hardly likely that the insertion of the qualifying phrase,
'where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly' was intended to reinstate the same Sherman
Act test [i.e., the rule of reason] which-had, at that very time [i.e., the
time when the Clayton Act was created] been determined to be in-
adequate.
'67
Since the collision of these two theories, there has appeared, on
the surface at least, to be confusion and vacillation among the FTC
opinions themselves and between the FTC opinions and the court
decisions. 68 No distinctions are made as to whether the action is
brought under Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC
Act; the issue is as to whether the qualitative or quantitative standard
should be used under either.69 One can look to the FTC in 1961 and
find two opinions holding the quantitative standard should be applied
to exclusive dealing agreements,7 0 another holding out for the qualita-
tive standard,7' and another indiscriminately citing both Tampa and
Standard as authorities.7 2
To see that there is confusion in the courts, one need look no
further than Susser v. Carel :13
We need not comment on whether the appellants [Susser]
could sustain their allegations under the doctrine enunciated
in Standard Oil, for it seems indisputable that in Tainpal Electric
the Court deviated from the more rigorous and inflexible rule
it had established in Standard Oil and erected criteria which
demand close scrutiny of the economic ramifications of an ex-
clusive dealing in order to determine the probable anti-competi-
tive effects of such a device.7 4 (Emphasis added.)
In another case, Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Cooperative Associ-
ation,'5 the court held that the Tampa case narrowed the rule in the
Standard case to the particular facts therein, and that "the court in
Tampa made it perfectly clear that neither comparative quantitative
substantiality [i.e., the market share foreclosed] nor absolute quantita-
tive substantiality [i.e., the dollar volume foreclosed] should be the
controlling factor." 6
67217 F. 2d at 827.
68 That the Commission and the courts should rule by the same standards, see
Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949); Aa-r'y GEN.
NAT'L CoriM. ANTITRUST REP., 148 n.77 (1955).69 Rural Gas Serv., 59 F.T.C. 912, 919 (1961).
70 International Staple & Mach. Co., 59 F.T.C. 1080, 1086 (1961) ; Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 58 F.T.C. 98, 112 (1961).
71 Rural Gas. Service, 59 F.T.C. 912, 918 (1961).72 Murray Space Shoe Corp., 59 F.T.C. 803, 833 (1961).
73 332 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
74 Id. at 516.
75202 F. Supp. 481 (1962). See United States v. Charles Pfizer Co., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 171445 at 80951 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
76 Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Cooperative Assn., supra note 75 at 484-85.
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However, the author feels that, in looking closer at the decisions
and opinions, the better view would be that neither Standard nor Tampa
applies to all exclusive dealing agreements in exclusion of the other.
There is no firm and set rule, and the courts and Commission exercise
a certain amount of discretion in construing all the factors within a
particular fact situation. Judicial and administrative bodies would
make their position clearer if they would not adopt the rule pertinent
to their situation by a shorthand reference to Standard or Tampa as
being exclusive of any other interpretation.
In the Tampa case itself, the court did not claim that the qualitative
test shall be the sole test for illegality of exclusive dealing agreements.
The court held that "in practical application, even though a contract
is found to be an exclusive-dealing arrangement, it does not violate
the section unless the court believes it probable that performance of
the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line
of commerce affected. ' 77 (Emphasis added.) Also, "the line of com-
merce . . . involved must be determined, where it is in controversy,
on the basis of facts peculiar to the case."78
The court stated that there was not enough in that fact situation
to show the probability of a substantial lessening of competition. De-
spite the money volume involved ($128 million over twenty years),
the court would require more proof before inferring the necessary
lessening of competition, as the contract covered only .77 per cent of
the market in which defendant and his competitors effectively com-
peted. Tampa, in construing the Standard case, stated:
There the impact of the requirements contracts was studied in
the setting of the large number of gasoline stations--8,937 or
16.7% of the retail outlets in the relevant market-and the large
number of contracts, over 8,000, together with the great volume
of products involved. This combination dictated a finding that
'Standard's use of the contracts [created] just such a potential
clog on competition as it was the purpose of §3 to remove'
where, as there, the effective proportion of retail sales was sub-
stantial79 (Emphasis added.)
The court in Tampa did not consider any of the factors in the case
strong enough to spring the case from a qualitative to a quantitative
type test. It stated, "there is here neither a seller with a dominant
position in the market as in Standard Fashion . . . nor myriad outlets
with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry-wide practice
of relying upon exclusive contracts, as in Standard Oil . . . nor a plainly
restrictive tying agreement, as in International Salt .
77 365 U.S. at 327.
7sIbid.
79 365 U.S. at 328-29.
80 Id. at 334.
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In Browtn Shoe v. United States,"' the court reiterated, though cer-
tainly not as explicitly as it could have, that both Standard and Tampa
apply to exclusive dealing agreements, and that a lack of size is one
of the factors that will take an. agreement from without the standard
test and place it under the Tampa test.
The FTC used this same rationale in Carvel, for it is in cases of
large dealers enforcing exclusive dealing agreements that the quanti-
tative test is used. Timken Roller Bearing Company was the nation's
largest manufacturer of tapered roller bearings . 2 The International
Staple & Machine Company controlled one-third of the market.8 3 Luria
Bros., Inc. was the nation's largest broker of iron and steel scrap. 4
In the leading Dictograph case, the court reasoned:
It seems clear that whatever utility the elaborate economic in-
quiry contended for by petitioner may still have under Section
3 of the Clayton Act when applied to' organizations not doing a
substantial share of the business or not yet firmly established in
a particular line of commerce, it has no place in a case such as
this where the condemned contracts are being employed by a
corporation which does almost $2,000,000 worth of business
each year, is one of the industry's three leaders, all or some of
whom use this restrictive device, and which alone controls by such
means over one-fifth of the nation's prime retail outlets for
products of this kind."'
In the 1962 case of Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. F.T.C.,s0
where the Commission relied on the Standard case and the Company
argued for the Tampa rule, the court flatly stated that Tampa, where
only .77 per cent of the market was affected, did not apply. The My-
tinger Company controlled 61.52 per cent, 34.6 per cent and 8.6 per cent
of three lines of commerce dealing in multi-vitamin supplements.
The FTC opinion in Rural Gas Service, Inc.8 7 is very relevant. The
Company controlled only three per cent of the sales in its total market
area and less than four per cent in a two-state test market area. The
Commission noted that the United States Supreme Court in Standard
went all the way dowr to a 6.7 per cent market foreclosure in applying
the quantitative test, but gave no indication as to just how low it will
go. However, in the Rural Gas opinion, the Commission said that it
was "not able to infer competitive injury solely from the market shares
foreclosed. Where foreclosure is so small, further evidence of com-
petitive effect is required." 's The Commission cited Tampa and ruled
81370 U.S. 294, 329-30 (1962).
S258 F.T.C. 98 (1961).
83 59 F.T.C. 1080 (1961).
84 TRADE REc. REP. (1963 Transfer Binder) 16299 (1963).
85 217 F. 2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954).
86 301 F. 2d 534, 539 (1962).
8759 F.T.C. 912 (1961).
s Id. at 918.
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that, due to the lack of evidence, there was no violation of Section 3
of the Clayton Act, and that the same lack of evidence ruled out any
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
One of the best clues to understanding the confusion in the qualita-
tive-quantitative struggle is supplied by Justice Frankfurter in his
dissenting opinion in the 1953 case of F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising.8 9 It is to be most importantly recalled that Justice Frank-
furter wrote the majority opinion in Standard Oil. In the illotion
Picture case, 90 he lists all the factors that mitigated against applying
a qualitative rule to the situation in the Standard case-Standard was
the largest seller of gasoline in the market; it controlled 16.7 per cent
of the retail outlets in the area purchasing $57 million worth of gas;
it was involved in a business that was significant to the public; there
was an obvious discrepancy of bargaining power between it and its
dealers ;91 the supplier, not the dealers, wanted and pressured for the
exclusive dealing agreements; it was the central business of those
affected; and competitors were absolutely excluded from the share
of the market foreclosed. It is also to be recalled that there were some
5937 dealers affected and that the practice of exclusive dealing agree-
ments was industry wide.
In final analysis, therefore, it appears that there are some factors,
as mentioned above, which will dictate use of the quantitative sub-
stantiality test rather than that of qualitative substantiality.92 Certainly,
the most important factor is market share. It appears that in the Carvel
case the FTC ignored the importance of market share when it stated
that it made no difference whether Carvel controlled 37.7 per cent or
4.5 per cent. If the reasoning suggested above had been accepted by
the Commission, the quantitative substantiality rule would have been
followed and might have induced a different result if the agreement
was treated as an exclusive dealing agreement. 93
BRUCE C. O'NEILL
SO 344 U.S. 392 (1953). Also note Justice Frankfurter's silent concurrence in the
Tainha case. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).90 F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401-03 (1953).
91 That discrepancy in bargaining power could grow to be a more heavily weight-
ed element in the future, see the Supreme Court's recent use of it in Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357, 368 (1965).
-However, the Court will always use the rule of reason test for vertical terri-
torial limitations, not being sufficiently familiar with such arrangements to
use a quantitative standard. White Motor Co .v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
263 (1963); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., 321 F. 2d 825, 828 (7th Cir.
1963).
93 Practically, the finding of the "not insubstantial amount" of commerce affected
facilitates the finding of the first element of sufficient economic power. See
note 50 supra. However, that the sufficient economic power is less easily found
than in tying products, see note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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